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ON THE POSSIBILITY OF  PRICE DECREASINC  BUBBLES 
ABSTRACT 
It is often  argued  that a rational bubble, because  it  is poaitive, must 
increase the price of a stock.  This argument is  not valid  in  general:  as 
soon as  bubbles affect  interest rates, the fundamental  value  of  a stock 
depends on  whether  or  not a bubble  is present.  The existence  of a rational 
bubble  then might, by raising equilibrium  interest rates,  depress the fun- 
damental to such  an extent  that  the sum of the positive  bubble  and decreased 
fundamental  falls short of  the fundamental, no-bubble  price.  Under  condi- 
tions made  precise below,  there can therefore be price  decreasing  bubbles, 
and an  asset can  be "undervalued." 
Philippe Weil 
Department of Economics 
Harvard  University 
Cambridge, MA  02138 A rational speculative bubble  on a stock which can  be  freely 
disposed  of — a  form  of limited  liability —  is non-negative  by 
definition:' it represents what an investor might be willing to pay 
to buy a stock forever  stripped of its dividends. The fundamental, 
on its part, represents the present discounted value of the dividend 
stream.  In legal terms, the fundamental  is the value of the u.sufruct, 
while the bubble measures the value of the stock minus its usufruct. 
For instance, a claim to an apple tree could be split into two as- 
sets:  a claim to the apple crop (whose value is the fundamental), 
and a claim to  the  useless2 wood itself (the bubble).  Because of 
the free disposal assumption, the price of the latter claim cannot 
be negative; a rational speculative bubble on an asset which can be 
costlessly destroyed is, therefore, non-negative. 
Much has been made of this fact in some  recent  discussions.3 
It has been in particular argued that the definition given supra of 
a rational bubble poorly captures  the essence of bubbles in actual 
economies.  Two reasons are advanced.  Firstly,  it is proposed,  "a 
bubble cannot start;  to exist, it must  be present since the origin 
of time."  This is true, but in the somewhat trivial sense that the 
equilibrium price today of something which has even an infinitesimal 
probability of being valued tomorrow cannot be zero; by backward 
recursion, every bubble which may conceivably arise tomorrow must 
exist today.  Secondly,  and more importantly, the above definition 
of a rational bubble is judged to be unsatisfactory because it cannot 
account for the existence of "undervalued" assets.  "Because bubbles 
are positive," it is claimed, "the presence of a bubble increases the 
equilibrium price of an asset.". 
The latter argument  is of course correct if the fundamental is 
independent of the presence or absence of a bubble:  the sum of a 
positive bubble and a fixed fundamental indeed exceeds  the funda- 
mental, and the  "bubbly"  price — in Tirole's  terminology — is, 
therefore, larger than the non-bubbly price.  As soon as either div- 
idends  or discount rates depend on the presence or absence of a 
'In the following, I adopt Tirole's [1982, 1985]  definition of a rational bubble. 
21 assume, for the sake of  discussion,  that apple wood can neither be  burned nor serve any 
other useful purpose, and is costless to destroy. 
3See, for instance, Diba and Grossman [1987] and West [1988]. 
1 bubble, however, the fundamental is affected by the presence of a 
bubble.  For instance — and this is the scenario explored in this 
paper,4 the existence of a bubble may lead to an increase in inter- 
est rates which so  depresses the fundamental that the sum of the 
positive bubble and of the bubbly fundamental falls short of the non- 
bubbly fundamental.  Hence, a positive rational bubble may in fact 
decrease the overall price of a stock, contrary to what is commonly 
believed. 
The purpose of this paper is to formalize the foregoing argument, 
and to determine conditions under which price decreasing bubbles 
on a stock may indeed exist, in general equilibrium, when the dis- 
count rate is not exogenous. In section 1, I construct a simple gen- 
eral equilibrium model in which a stock need not be priced at its 
fundamental.  In section 2, I derive existence conditions for price de- 
creasing rational bubbles.  The conclusion summarizes the results. 
research. 
1.  The model 
To make sense of the question asked in this paper — can price de- 
creasing bubbles  exist in general equilibrium ?  — it is of course 
necessary to first construct a model in which asset bubbles are at all 
possible. This is achieved, most simply, by considering a simple two- 
period overlapping generation model without intergenerational  al- 
truism which provides, through  the perpetual arrival of new cohorts, 
the new entrants into the market required, as shown by Tirole [1982], 
for the existence of a rational speculative bubbles. What is therefore 
crucial, in this overlapping generation setting,  for the existence of 
bubbles is not the finiteness of the agents' horizon but, instead, the 
fact that successive generations are economically distinct.5 
4The other  possibility — namely that managers may pay attention, when setting dividends 
or issuing new shares, to the existence of  a bubble on their company's stock — is not analyzed 
here. A result akin to Wallace's  [1980] theorem on the maximum rate of  growth of the money 
supply is likely to hold in that setting: the bubble on a stock must be driven to zero if new 
bubbly shares are issued "too fast" by the firm. 
5See my [1987] paper for an example of an economy in which bubbles are possible, despite  the infinite horizon of  every agent alive, because of the continuous arrival into the economy  of new infinitely-lived  families. 
2 1.1.  Consumers 
Consumers live for two periods. Population  is constant, with repro- 
duction  assumed to take place  by parthenogenesis.6A11  consumers 
are identical, both within a generation and across cohorts.  There 
is only one non-storable good, call it a fruit. A (selfish) representa- 
tive consumer born at time t wishes to maximize the time separable 
utility 
U  U(Cit) + V(C2t)  (1) 
he derives from his consumption bundle (cii, c2t)  when young and 
old. The functions u(.) and v(.) are defined on R+, are continuous, 
increasing and concave, and satisfy the following assumptions: 
Assumption 1 lim_.o u'(c) = lim_+o v'(c) = +00, 
Assumption 2  u'(c) = lim_+  v'(c) = 0. 
Each agent receives an endowment (e1, e2),  e1 > 0,  e2 ￿  0 of the 
consumption  good.  It is in addition  assumed that  the following 
inequality holds: 
Assumption 3 u'(ei)/v'(e2) <  1, 
which  implies  the  dynamic  inefficiency,  in  this  zero population 
growth economy, of any competitive equilibrium yielding (e1, e2) as a 
consumption allocation. This crucial assumption will be used infra. 
To smooth out, if desired, his consumption profile, our consumer 
can buy Xt  fruit producing trees, at a price of Pt fruits  each.  His 
budget constraints are thus:7 
cit +PtXt  =  ci,  (2) 
C2t  =  e2 + (pt+i + yg+i)xt,  (3) 
Clt,C2t ￿  0,  (4) 
where Yt+i > 0 denotes the fruit output of a tree at time t + 1. The 
first-order condition for an interior8 utility maximum is simply 
Pt U'(Cit) = (pt+i + yt+i) V'(C21),  (5) 
6See Bernheim and Bagwell [1988] for the complications introduced by marriage.  i do not  explicitly introduce a consumption-loans market,  as it will  be inactive in 
equilibrium. 
8Corner solutions are not characterized,  as equilibrium considerations impose interiority. 
3 Equation (5) can be solved, using (2) and (3), for the optimum tree 
holding: 
(pt+i+yi+i\  PtXj  =  S1 
\.  pi  I 
where S(.) denotes the savings function. 
1.2.  Technology 
Trees have the following  features.  There is a constant  number of 
identical trees, normalized without loss of generality to be equal to 
the size of the population; the number of trees per capita is therefore 
equal to 1. It is known from the origin of time that 
_fy>O  forO<t<T—1; 
fort￿T. 
where T is a possibly very large but finite integer..  In other terms, 
a tree produces fruits  for only a finite number of periods.  In the 
long run (t ￿  T), trees become sterile. It is further assumed, in the 
spirit of the discussion above, that the wood of the tree is intrin- 
sicálly useless and costless to destroy; the only reason a consumer 
might therefore choose to buy a tree in or after period T —  1  is for 
speculative purposes:  "buying in order to resell."  Prior to period 
T — 1, however, trees have a positive fundamental — the piesent 
discounted value of future dividends. 
The rationale  for  specifying the dividend process in that fash- 
ion is best understood  by remembering Tirole's [1985] results:  if i) 
dividends are capitalized  ex ante (i.e., all the trees ever present in 
the economy are traded today ), and ii) dividends per head do not 
become zero in the long run, there cannot be a bubble on a asset 
with a fundamental.  Our setup violates the second condition — the 
dividend per head becomes zero after time T — which leaves open 
the possibility that a bubble may exist on trees.9 
9See Tirole's [1985] Proposition 1. 
4 1.3.  Competitive equilibria 
In a competitive equilibrium, a representative consumer must hold 
— because of the choice of units — precisely one tree: 
Xt  =  1  Vt￿0.  (8) 
Therefore, substituting (8) into (5), one finds that the equilibrium 
fruit price of trees must satisfy the  following  first-order difference 
equation: 
p u'(ei 
— Pt) = (Pt+i + yt÷i) v'(e2 +Pt+i + yt+i),  (9) 
which is forced by the dividend process given in (7).  Equivalently, 
the equilibrium fruit price of a tree must follow 
Pt  = 
s(Pt+i±1). 
(10) 
Given the structure of the dividend process, it is simplest to divide 
the solution procedure into two parts: t ￿  T  —  1  and t < T —  2. 
1.3.1.  Long run (t ￿  T — 1) 
Trees become intrinsically useless as of period T. Their fundamen- 
tal value is thus zero as of period T —  1  whether or not a bubble 
is present. Determining the equilibrium price of trees thus amounts 
to studying whether or not a bubble on an intrinsically useless as- 
set may exist in this economy starting in period T —  1.  Now we 
know, from Gale [1973], from Wallace's [1980] results on fiat money 
equilibria and Tirole's [1985] related  work on bubbles, that, in many 
cases, the dynamic inefficiency of the bubbleless economy is neces- 
sary and sufficient for the existence of bubbly  equilibria.  As the 
following shows, this holds true in the present model. 
If trees are not valued in and after period T —  1  (Pt  =  0 for 
t ￿  T — 1), the competitive equilibrium consumption allocation is, 
trivially, the autarkic one (e1, e2) — which, by construction [see (3)], 
is dynamically inefficient.  This equilibrium is one in which there is 
no bubble:  the price of a tree is equal to its zero fundamental. 
5 But then, because Assumption 3  holds, it is easy to check that 
there also exists a stationary golden rule bubbly equilibrium char- 
acterized by 
pg  =  Vt￿T—l, 
where j3 is given, from (10) and the fact that the dividend is zero 
after T  —  1, by 
= S(I) >  0, 
with the inequality implied by the dynamic inefficiency  of the au- 
tarkic equilibrium imposed by assumption 310 Because the long run 
fundamental is constructed to be zero independently of equilibrium 
interest rates, j3 represents a pure bubble. Bubbles are thus trivially 
price increasing in the long run in this economy — in accordance 
with the intuition given in the introduction. 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to note that there exists 
many non-stationary  equilibria in addition to the stationary equi- 
libria described above.  Following standard11  arguments, it is easy 
to show that if the interest elasticity of savings is not too negative, 
these non-stationary paths converge  to the inefficient non-bubbly 
steady state.  If income effects  are strong (S'(.)  0),  however, 
cyclical or chaotic equilibria may occur.  For the sake of simplicity, I 
henceforth concentrate on equilibria which are stationary as of pe- 
riod T —  1  —i.e., equilibria which are such that either pg = 0 or 
pg = j3 for all t ￿ .T — 1. 
1.3.2.  Short-run (t <T — 1) 
In the short run, trees have a positive fundamental.  Let 
— Pt) 
v'(e2 +pgj. + y) 
denote the (implicit)  interest  rate on consumption loans  between 
periods t and t + 1.  The fundamental value f. of a tree at some 
date r  — 1 is simply the present discounted value of dividends 
'°Equivalently, 73 is the stationary solution to (9). 
"See, for instance, Grandmont [1985], Tirole [1985], and Wallace  [1980]. 
6 distributed by trees until T — 1, i.e., 
(14) 
ir+1  fls=r+i  s 
Note that the discount factors depend on the asset price itself, so 
that the fundamental will differ in general differ across bubbly and 
non-bubbly equilibria. 
The equilibrium behavior of tree prices in the short run is charac- 
terized, from (7) and (10), by backward'2 iterations of the difference 
equation 
pi 
— pt) = (p1+1 + y) v'(e2 +Pi±i + y),  (15) 
subject to either of the following "terminal" conditions: 
PT-i = 0  or  PT-i =  j3.  (16) 
Because the function p u'(ej 
— p) is increasing and maps, using (1) 
and (2), the interval [0, e1) onto [0, +oo), it has an inverse, so that 
the backward perfect foresight dynamics are uniquely defined,  and 
can be represented, from (15), as 
Pt  =  '(pt+i),  (17) 
where cp, continuous and differentiable, maps [0, oo) onto [0, ei). 
Using (17) and the  terminal conditions  (16), two competitive 
(long-run stationary) equilibrium paths emerge: 
• a non-bubbly equilibrium path ii =  . .  0,0, . . 
• a bubbly equilibrium path  = (j3o,j3,,. . . ,13T2,I3,,• 
where's and  's henceforth denote, respectively, the non-bubbly and 
bubbly price sequences. Notice that, for each type of equilibrium, 
the associated fundamental (which need not be explicitly computed) 
is unique.'3  It of course differs across equilibria. 
Although in the long run a bubble is necessarily price increasing 
since j3 > 0, it is possible, as the next section will demonstrate, that 
it be price decreasing in the short run. 
'2Backward perfect foresight  dynamics are the appropriate solution concept in this model, 
and not just an analytical device  as in Grandmont [1985]. 
13This is true in this model because the asset stops paying dividends in finite time.  In 
more general frameworks,  there might be, for instance, several non-bubbly fundamentals (e.g. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff [1983].) 
7 2.  Price decreasing bubbles 
I now turn to the comparison of the non-bubbly and bubbly price 
sequences,  and ,  and ask whether it is possible to have, for some 
r  —  1, j3. <j5.. From basic economic  reasoning, the answer to 
this question must crucially depend on the preferences of consumers, 
and more precisely on on the sign and magnitude of their interest 
elasticity of savings. 
To understand why this is so, it is necessary to consider in detail 
the channels through which the presence of a bubble might lead to 
a decrease of the overall price of the asset. As mentioned supra, the 
main requirement is that the presence of a bubble decrease the as- 
set's fundamental.  In this world in which the dividends distributed 
by the tree are exogenous, such a decrease can only  occur if the 
interest rates at which future dividends are discounted are higher in 
the bubbly path then in the non-bubbly path.  The existence of a 
price decreasing bubble therefore must require that higher equilib- 
rium interest rates be associated with a lower overall real value of 
the stock of trees — which  cannot occur if the interest elasticity of 
savings is positive.  The critical role of income effects is formalized 
in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1  If the interest elasticity of savings, S'(.), is positive, 
bubbles are price increasing in the short run as well as in the long 
run. 
Proof.  The long run part of the proposition was proved in 1.3.1. The short 
run part is proved by backward induction. We know that, as ofT—i,  the bubble 
is price increasing, since j3> 0. Can it be non-price increasing at T—2? Suppose 
it is, so that j3T—2  PT—2.  Then (3 +  y)/73T—2 > Y/PT—2.  But if S'(.) > 0,  this 
implies in equilibrium that T—2 = S[(15 + y)/13T—2] > S[y/T_2] = PT—2  — a 
contradiction!  Hence T—2 > pT_2: the bubble is price increasing at T — 2.  By 
a similar  argument,  one shows that if the bubble is price increasing at r  T  —2, 
it is price increasing at r—1 if S'(.) > 0.  Therefore the bubble is price increasing 
at every date, in the short run and in the long run. 
The  intuition  underlying  the  proof  of  this  proposition  is 
straightforward.  For interest rates to be higher in the bubbly equi- 
librium  than in the  non-bubbly one (a necessary condition for  a 
8 bubble to be price decreasing), it must be the case, if the interest 
elasticity of savings is positive, that trees crowd out consumption 
loans in the bubbly equilibrium relative to the non-bubbly case.14 
But if the bubble is price decreasing, the real value of the stock' of 
trees is lower in the bubbly than in the non-bubbly equilibrium —. 
i.e., trees crowd consumption loans in, not out!  Whence the contra- 
diction on which the proof is based, and which can only be resolved 
by allowing for a negative interest elasticity of savings.'5 
What happens when the interest elasticity of savings is negative 
critically depends, as in endogenous business cycle theory,'6 on the 
particular specification of the utility function and of the endowment 
vector.  The striking pattern of a bubble which is price increasing' 
in, say, even periods and price decreasing in odd periods emerges in 
the following case: 
Proposition 2 Suppose  the interest  elasticity of savings in néga- 
tive, and that the secpnd period endowment is zerO.  Then,  in the 
short run, the bubble on the tree is price decreasing in periods T— 2k, 
and price increasing in periods T — 2k + 1, where k is a positive in- 
teger. 
Proof. Since e2 = 0 (a specification which satisfies, because  of assumption  1, 
condition 3), it is straightforward to show from (5) that the interest elasticity of 
savings is negative if the function g(x)  xv'(x) is decreasing over the interval 
[0,ei).  But then, from  (15) and (17), the map ça is decreasing.  Therefore, 
PT—2 = Q3) < so(O)  = T_2: the  bubble is price decreasing at T — 2.  This 
implies that T—3 =  cp(fiT—2) > lp(15T_2) = pT_3:  the bubble is price increasing 
at T — 3.  Similarly, it is price decreasing at T — 4, price increasing at T — 5, 
etc., until the origin of time is reached. 
Proposition  2 applies, for instance, to the case of isoelastic util- 
ity:  u(c) = v(c) = clP/(l 
— p), with  p  >  1  to, yield a negative 
interest elasticity of savings.  Extending this Proposition  to allow 
for a non-zero second period endowment or an interest elasticity of 
savings non-uniformly negative presents little interest, except that 
14This crowding out is of course only incipient, since the interest rate adjusts to make the 
consumption loans market inactive in equilibrium. 
15The borderline case in which intertemporal substitution and income  effects cancel each 
other out to yield S'(.) =  0 is not considered  for the sake of  brevity. It can be agglomerated 
into the positive interest elasticity of  savings case with a slight change in the proofs. 
16Ses Grandmont [1985]. 
9 of a theoretical  curiosum, since Proposition 2 decisively establishes 
that there is indeed no reason to presume, as is often done, that 
the presence of a bubble always raises the price of an asset.  On the 
contrary, complex patterns — in general more complex than the one 
exhibited here and related to those described by Grandmont  [1985]  — emerge as soon as even a small (in absolute value) but negative 
interest  elasticity of savings  is allowed.  As for the argument  that 
economies with negative interest elasticities of savings are patholog- 
ical so that their behavior can be disregarded, it is best countered 
by the remark that the empirical evidence on the sensitivity of life- 
cycle savings to changes in interest rates is mixed and can not rule 
out an S'(.) negative but close to zero. 
Conclusion 
This paper has established that, contrary to what is often claimed, 
rational speculative bubbles, which are positive by definition, need 
not increase the price of the asset to which they are attached 
because the fundamental  is not in general independent, in equilib- 
rium, of the bubble. It is therefore possible to observe situations in 
which bubbles are price decreasing: the price of an asset subject to 
a bubble might be lower than the price of that asset in the absence 
of a bubble. 
Whether that situation should be construed as one in which the 
asset is "undervalued" is mainly a question of semantics.  If by un- 
dervaluation it is meant that the price falls short of the fundamental 
in the particular equilibrium under consideration, an asset is indeed, 
by this narrow definition, never undervalued: the price of an asset 
which can be freely disposed of always is never lower than the value 
of its usufruct. If undervaluation is taken in the broader acceptation 
of "existence of a bubbly equilibrium with lower asset prices than the 
non-bubbly equilibrium", then an asset can indeed be undervalued. 
Psychological factors, "animal spirits"  and extraneous waves  of 
pessimism can, in any case,  depress as well as raise an asset price 
relative to its "fundamental" non-bubbly value. 
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